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INTRODUCTION 
Life on the high seas was not easy for seamen, as this life involved 
cruel treatment by masters and a lack of regulation.1 Historically, this class 
of maritime workers has been entitled to special judicial protections as the 
wards of admiralty.2 Although admiralty courts understandably became a 
shield for these workers in turbulent times, a seaman today is no longer 
thrown into the same rough waters. Congress has legislated extensively in 
the area of maritime tort remedies,3 and employers have responded by 
making worker safety a major goal of the maritime shipping industry.4 
Consequently, courts should no longer use the rocky waters of the past as 
justification to expand claims and remedies when the seas are much 
calmer.  
One remedy that courts have recently expanded is the availability of 
punitive damages to seamen.5 In Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend,6 
the United States Supreme Court held that seamen were entitled under 
general maritime law to recover punitive damages for their employer’s 
intentional failure to pay maintenance and cure—a remedy that includes 
medical and living expenses arising out of an accident or illness that occurs 
during the seaman’s employment.7 The Court based its decision on the 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by PHILLIP M. SMITH. 
 1. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 2. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009). 
 3. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990). 
 4. See generally Stanley A. Millan & Patrick J. Veters, Deck the Hulls with 
OSHA, 2 LOY. MAR. L.J. 44 (2003) (discussing the dual regulatory authority of the 
United States Coast Guard and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
in the field of maritime worker safety). 
 5. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 424. 
 6. 557 U.S. 404. 
 7. Id. at 424. 
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alleged historic availability of such damages and the absence of statutory 
preemption.8 It is unclear whether the reasoning of this decision extends 
to allow recovery of punitive damages for unseaworthiness—the general 
maritime-law duty imposed on a shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel.9 
Recently, in McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C.,10 the United States Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that unseaworthiness punitive 
damages are unavailable.11 The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition 
for a writ of certiorari, ensuring that the availability of unseaworthiness 
punitive damages and the scope of the Court’s reasoning in Townsend will 
remain unsettled outside the Fifth Circuit.12 As district courts in other circuits 
have allowed punitive recovery for unseaworthiness, the Court should resolve 
this important issue and establish uniformity throughout the country.13 
Otherwise, the scattered availability of unseaworthiness punitive damages 
will have a detrimental impact on maritime shipping, an industry that is 
responsible for transporting the majority of the world’s goods.14 
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that unseaworthiness 
punitive damages should not be available to seamen for three reasons.15 
First, the reasoning of Townsend does not extend to unseaworthiness, 
because no significant history of unseaworthiness punitive damages exists, 
and the failure to pay maintenance and cure is a fundamentally different 
legal claim.16 Second, the unavailability of punitive damages under the 
Jones Act17—a statutory negligence action for seamen—should be 
extended to unseaworthiness because the two claims typically involve a 
                                                                                                             
 8. Id. at 424–25. 
 9. Compare Snyder v. L & M Botruc Rental, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 728, 737 
(E.D. La. 2013) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages are unavailable 
under general maritime law), with Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC, 2010 
A.M.C. 2469, 2483 (D. Haw. 2010) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive 
damages are available under general maritime law). 
 10. 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 11. Id. at 384 (holding that Miles controlled their decision).  
 12. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).  
 13. Compare Snyder, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 737, with Wagner, 2010 A.M.C. at 
2483. 
 14. See McBride, 768 F.3d at 401 (Clement, J., concurring) (“Given the 
sizeable percentages of the world’s goods that travel on ships, and the fact that the 
prices of the remainder of the world’s goods are indirectly influenced by the prices 
of the goods that do travel on ships (e.g., oil prices ultimately affect the price of a 
vast range of items), the decision in this case needs to have only the minutest 
impact on shipping prices to have a significant aggregate cost for consumers. In 
light of the potentially sizable impact, this court should not venture too far and 
too fast in these largely uncharted waters without a clear signal from Congress.”). 
 15. Id. at 384. 
 16. See infra Part III.A.  
 17. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012). 
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single legal wrong.18 Third, the court in McBride properly determined that 
courts should not distinguish the availability of unseaworthiness punitive 
damages between injured seamen and wrongful-death representatives.19 To 
preserve uniformity in admiralty and protect the interests of maritime 
commerce, the Supreme Court should address this issue and hold that 
unseaworthiness punitive damages are unavailable.20  
Part I of this Note provides background on the powers of Congress and 
the federal courts to create admiralty law and explicates the specific 
remedies that these branches have made available to seamen. Part II explains 
the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in McBride and chronicles the uncertain 
history of maritime punitive damages. Finally, Part III analyzes whether 
unseaworthiness punitive damages should be available and concludes that 
the Fifth Circuit reached the correct result in McBride.  
I. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND THE COURTS IN CALMING 
THE STORMY SEAS 
The legislative and judicial branches have a concurrent role in shaping 
admiralty law.21 Determining the remedies available to an injured seaman 
is an important issue in admiralty law that the Constitution requires these 
institutions to resolve.22 Those remedies exist under both statutes23 and 
judge-made common law;24 however, whether the responsibility to expand 
these claims belongs to Congress or the courts remains unclear.  
A. The Scope of Admiralty Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the United States Constitution as 
granting the federal government the power to determine the substantive law 
in admiralty.25 In the United States, two primary sources of maritime law 
exist: general maritime common law, which the federal courts developed 
                                                                                                             
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. See infra Part III.C. 
 20. See infra Part III.D. 
 21. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“[I]n the absence of 
some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts 
constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction.”).  
 22. See infra Part I.B. 
 23. See, e.g., The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012). 
 24. See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
 25. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 215 (“Considering our former opinions, it must now 
be accepted as settled doctrine that in consequence of these provisions Congress 
has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail 
throughout the country.”). 
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under the authority of the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution,26 and 
statutory maritime law that Congress enacted.27 In the absence of a 
controlling statute by Congress, judge-made common law governs 
admiralty.28 The interplay and seemingly concurrent authority in this area 
causes conflicts to arise between Congress and the federal courts.29  
Although maritime tort law in early America consisted mostly of 
judge-made common law,30 federal statutes now dominate this subset of 
admiralty.31 Recently, the Court has advocated for judicial restraint in 
areas where Congress has passed legislation, speaking specifically to the 
balance between Congressional statutes and judge-made maritime 
common law.32 The Court acknowledged that Congress “retains superior 
authority in these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to 
overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.”33 
Critics claim that this reasoning was a complete departure from the 
                                                                                                             
 26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 27. 46 U.S.C. § 30104; see also Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 
U.S. 354, 360–61 (1959); but see William H. Theis, United States Admiralty Law 
as an Enclave of Federal Common Law, 23 TUL. MAR. L.J. 73, 75 (1998) (“The 
Constitution contemplates that, before Congress enacted a single statute, there 
was an already existing body of maritime law. The historical understanding was 
that federal courts had the constitutional authority to declare admiralty law only 
to the extent that they dealt with issues recognized by other maritime countries as 
calling for a specialized body of law necessary to satisfy the needs of maritime 
commerce. Although admiralty law was not frozen as of 1789, it is erroneous to 
posit that admiralty law is whatever law the courts (or the legislature) create to 
deal with cases that fall within admiralty jurisdiction, a jurisdiction whose limits 
are largely defined by the courts themselves.”). 
 28. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 215. 
 29. Theis, supra note 27, at 74. 
 30. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 207 (1994) (“[T]he Judiciary 
has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law 
maritime.” (quoting United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 
(1975))); see also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“Congress 
has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules 
of admiralty law.”); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 
323 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is appropriate to recall that the 
preponderant body of maritime law comes from this Court and not from 
Congress.”); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“No area of federal law is judge-made at its source 
to such an extent as is the law of admiralty.”). 
 31. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990).  
 32. Id. at 27 (“In this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these 
legislative enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement these statutory 
remedies where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such policies 
consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly within 
the limits imposed by Congress.”). 
 33. Id. 
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traditional roles of Congress and the courts.34 However, Congress is 
arguably in a better position to prescribe the substantive law in admiralty 
as an elected, law-making body. Unlike the judiciary, the legislative 
branch is able to investigate critical policy concerns, such as the impact of 
remedial expansions on the maritime shipping industry.35  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the constitutional 
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government as providing a 
body of law “operating uniformly in[] the whole country.”36 The goal of 
uniformity demands consistency in the law governing persons and 
companies engaged in the interstate and international maritime industry.37 
For example, in the context of state workers’ compensation schemes, the 
Court held that Congress could not authorize states to provide the 
compensation remedy for maritime workers under the Constitution 
because inconsistent remedies in different state systems would destroy the 
uniformity that the Constitution required.38 The Court has also applied this 
uniformity principle to interactions between judge-made common law and 
maritime statutes by providing that if a certain type of recovery is 
unavailable under a statutory claim, the courts should be reluctant to allow 
such relief on a similar claim brought under general maritime law.39 The 
uniformity principle gives guidance as to what remedies and recoveries 
are available to seamen, particularly in the area of punitive damages.  
B. The Remedies Available to the Wards of Admiralty 
Only maritime workers who qualify as seamen are entitled to sue their 
employers for maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and negligence 
under the Jones Act.40 The Court has fashioned a two-part test to determine 
whether a maritime worker satisfies the requirements of seaman status: (1) 
                                                                                                             
 34. See David W. Robertson, Our High Court of Admiralty and Its Sometimes 
Peculiar Relationship with Congress, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 491, 514 (2011) 
(arguing that courts should not be hesitant to expand maritime tort remedies 
simply because federal statutes exist).  
 35. Theis, supra note 27, at 74 (recognizing that Congress is the preeminent 
creator of admiralty law). 
 36. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). 
 37. Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of 
Seeking “Uniformity” and “Legislative Intent” in Maritime Personal Injury 
Cases, 55 LA. L. REV. 745, 765 (1995) (arguing that uniformity should not be 
applied in the personal injury context because that area has “always been 
characterized by substantial differences”). 
 38. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920). 
 39. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) (“[A]n admiralty 
court should look primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance.”); 
see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978). 
 40. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995). 
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the employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to 
the accomplishment of its mission; and (2) the employee must have a 
connection to a vessel, or to an identifiable fleet of vessels under common 
ownership or control, that is substantial in both duration and nature.41 If 
that test is satisfied, the worker is a seaman who can recover personal-
injury damages under maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and Jones 
Act negligence.  
1. Maintenance and Cure 
In 1903, the Supreme Court explicated the remedies available to 
seamen under the general maritime common law in The Osceola.42 First, 
the Court recognized “[t]hat the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a 
seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of 
his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage 
is continued.”43 The remedy is commonly referred to as the employer’s 
obligation to pay maintenance and cure.44 Following The Osceola, the 
Court has explained that maintenance and cure includes wages until the 
end of the voyage, a sum for food and lodging, and medical expenses until 
the seaman reaches maximum medical cure for his condition.45 An 
employer’s failure to pay maintenance and cure constitutes a second injury 
occurring after the illness, incident, or negligent act that caused the initial 
                                                                                                             
 41. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991) (“The key 
to seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation . . . 
we believe the requirement that an employee’s duties must ‘contribut[e] to the 
function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission’ captures well an 
important requirement of seaman status.” (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266 
F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959))); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (“[A] seaman must 
have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such 
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”); Harbor 
Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 558, 560 (1997) (The Court added the 
requirement that the identifiable group of vessels must be subject to “common 
ownership or control.”).  
 42. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
 43. Id. 
 44. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 
6:12, at 305–10 (2d ed. 1975). 
 45. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001); see also 
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, at 305–10 (describing “maintenance and cure” 
as including medical expenses, a living allowance, and unearned wages). A 
seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure until he or she reaches “maximum 
cure”—the point at which medical science can no longer improve the seaman’s 
condition. See Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 524 (1949) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  
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injury to the seaman.46 The Court has acknowledged this distinction by 
emphasizing that “a seaman’s action for [the wrongful failure to pay] 
maintenance and cure is ‘independent’ and ‘cumulative’ from other claims 
such as negligence and that the maintenance and cure right is ‘in no sense 
inconsistent with, or an alternative of, the right to recover compensatory 
damages [under the Jones Act].’”47 Due to the unique risks seamen face in 
the course of their employment, courts have liberally construed the 
maintenance and cure remedy in favor of the seaman to allow recovery.48 
In this spirit, the Court recently concluded in Townsend that an employer’s 
willful failure to pay maintenance and cure could result in punitive 
damages.49 
2. Unseaworthiness 
The second general maritime law remedy recognized by The Osceola 
was “[t]hat the vessel and her owner are . . . liable to an indemnity for 
injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the 
ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances 
appurtenant to the ship.”50 Fundamentally, this means that a shipowner has 
a duty to provide a seaworthy vessel that is reasonably fit for its intended 
use.51 Although the origins of unseaworthiness give the impression that 
                                                                                                             
 46. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, at 342 (“It is unquestioned law that 
both the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness remedies are additional to 
maintenance and cure: the seaman may have maintenance and cure and also one 
of the other two.”). 
 47. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 (2009) (quoting Pac. 
S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1928)) (alteration in the original); see 
also David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 73, 147 (1997) [hereinafter Punitive Damages] (“[T]he action 
for damages for withholding maintenance and cure is ‘completely separate and 
independent’ from the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.” (quoting E. 
DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 95.24 (1987))). 
 48. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724, 727–28 (1943) (“From 
the earliest times maritime nations have recognized that unique hazards, 
emphasized by unusual tenure and control, attend the work of seamen.”); see 
generally Koistinen v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 83 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 
1948) (awarding maintenance and cure to a seaman who injured himself when he 
was forced to jump from a brothel window after a dispute arose over fees). 
 49. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 424. 
 50. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
 51. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (“What has 
been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish an accident-free 
ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and 
appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is not perfection, 
but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every conceivable storm or 
withstand every imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for 
her intended service.”). 
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the claim is rooted in a negligence action, which would impose a duty on 
the shipowner to exercise due diligence,52 the Supreme Court has accepted 
that The Osceola “enunciated a concept of absolute liability for 
unseaworthiness unrelated to principles of negligence law.”53 In Mahnich v. 
Southern Steamship Co.,54 the Court interpreted The Osceola to hold that the 
duty to provide a seaworthy ship does not depend on the negligence of 
shipowners or their agents.55 The Court went further in Seas Shipping Co. v. 
Sieracki,56 stating that unseaworthiness “is essentially a species of liability 
without fault . . . . neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual 
in character.”57 The Supreme Court  has argued, however, that the doctrine 
has developed to closely resemble a negligence action.58 Rarely will a 
situation arise where the facts creating an unseaworthy condition would not 
also give rise to a claim for negligence.59 In further support of this notion, the 
Court has stated that “[w]e are able to find no rational basis . . . for 
distinguishing negligence from seaworthiness.”60 The Supreme Court, 
however, has not yet decided whether punitive damages are available to 
seamen when an unseaworthy condition causes injury.61 
                                                                                                             
 52. See id. at 544 (“The decisions of [the late nineteenth century] for the most 
part treated maritime injury cases on the same footing as cases involving the duty 
of a shoreside employer to exercise ordinary care to provide his employees with 
a reasonably safe place to work.”).  
 53. Id. at 547. 
 54. 321 U.S. 96 (1944). 
 55. Id. at 100. 
 56. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). 
 57. Id. at 94. 
 58. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971) (“[O]ur 
cases have held that the scope of unseaworthiness is by no means so limited. A 
vessel’s condition of unseaworthiness might arise from any number of 
circumstances. Her gear might be defective, her appurtenances in disrepair, her 
crew unfit. The number of men assigned to perform a shipboard task might be 
insufficient. The method of loading her cargo, or the manner of its stowage, might 
be improper. For any of these reasons, or others, a vessel might not be reasonably 
fit for her intended service.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 418 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[I]t will be rare that the circumstances of an injury 
will constitute negligence but not unseaworthiness.”); Note, The Doctrine of 
Unseaworthiness in the Lower Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 819, 820 (1963) 
(“An unseaworthy condition can be found in almost anything, no matter how 
trivial, that causes injury.”); but see Magnussen v. Yak, Inc., 73 F.3d 245, 248 
(9th Cir. 1996) (where a jury found the vessel seaworthy, but still found the 
employer liable for negligence under the Jones Act).  
 60. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 815 
(2001).  
 61. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 
2014) (en banc).  
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3. Negligence: The Jones Act 
Although The Osceola prohibited seamen from suing their employers 
for negligence, the Jones Act legislatively overruled this bar to recovery 
by creating a negligence action for seamen against their employers.62 The 
Jones Act broadened the remedies available to seamen through its 
incorporation by reference of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(“FELA”).63 In overruling The Osceola’s negligence prohibition, Congress 
demonstrated that maritime statutes preempt judge-made common law.64 
Under the Jones Act, a seaman can recover for injuries sustained in the 
course and scope of his employment due to the negligence of the owner, 
master, or fellow crew members.65 Because of their extensive overlap, Jones 
Act negligence and unseaworthiness are often referred to as the “Siamese 
twins” of admiralty.66 Seamen cannot recover punitive damages under the 
Jones Act because they are not recoverable under FELA.67 As a result, the 
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that the logic 
that blocks punitive damages under the Jones Act extends to 
unseaworthiness.68 
                                                                                                             
 62. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991). The third 
and fourth points of The Osceola overruled by the Jones Act were:  
3. That all the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, are, as 
between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover 
for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the 
crew beyond the expense of his maintenance and cure.  
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the 
negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to 
maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence 
or accident. 
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
 63. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012) (“A seaman injured in the course of employment 
or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may 
elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the 
employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or 
death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”). 
 64. See Wilander, 498 U.S. at 341 (explaining that Congress twice tried to 
overrule The Osceola to create a negligence action for seamen). 
 65. Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1489 (5th Cir. 
1992). 
 66. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 6:38, at 383. 
 67. See infra Part III.B.1; but see John W. deGravelles, Supreme Court 
Charts Course for Maritime Punitive Damages, 22 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 123, 144 
(2009) (“Punitive damages are pecuniary and therefore there is no legitimate 
reason why punitive damages should be withheld in a Jones Act case.”). 
 68. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(en banc). 
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II. MCBRIDE AND MARITIME PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR SEAMEN 
In McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., the United States Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a seaman could not recover punitive damages for 
unseaworthiness.69 The decision correctly recognized that courts should be 
reluctant to allow seamen to recover unseaworthiness punitive damages 
when a similar statutory claim, the Jones Act, prohibits punitive relief.70 
A. The Case: McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C. 
The Fifth Circuit was the first federal circuit court to consider whether 
punitive damages are available under the general maritime claim of 
unseaworthiness after the Supreme Court’s decision in Townsend.71 In 
holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages were not available, the 
Fifth Circuit addressed important questions regarding the reasoning and 
scope of the Supreme Court’s previous decisions on the subject.72 This 
issue is still far from settled, however, as some district courts have reached 
different conclusions.73 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
McBride,74 the Court will likely resolve this important issue eventually, 
hopefully using the persuasive reasoning of the Fifth Circuit as guidance.  
1. Facts and Procedural History 
The case arose from an accident that occurred on Estis Rig 23, a barge 
that supported a truck-mounted drilling rig operating in Bayou Sorrell, a 
navigable waterway in Louisiana.75 The crew, all employed by Estis Well 
Service, attempted to straighten the monkey board on the derrick, which 
had twisted the previous night.76 The derrick pipe shifted during this task, 
which caused the rig and derrick to topple over.77 One crew member, Skye 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 391. 
 71. Id. at 384.  
 72. Id. at 384–85. 
 73. See, e.g., Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC, 2010 A.M.C. 2469, 
2483 (D. Haw. 2010) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages are 
available under general maritime law). 
 74. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015). 
 75. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 872 F. Supp. 2d 511, 512 (W.D. La. 
2012). 
 76. Id. A monkey board is a catwalk that extends from a derrick, which is the 
tower-like framework over an oil well. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 
731 F.3d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc granted, 743 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
 77. McBride, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 512. 
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Sonnier, died after being pinned between the derrick and the mud tank.78 
Three other members of the crew also claimed injuries resulting from the 
incident.79  
Haleigh McBride, individually and on behalf of her and Sonnier’s minor 
child, filed suit against Estis, stating causes of action for unseaworthiness 
under general maritime law and negligence under the Jones Act.80 Notably, 
McBride sought “punitive and/or exemplary” damages in addition to 
compensatory damages for the claims filed.81 The other crew members 
alleged the same theories and requested similar punitive relief.82 After the 
case was consolidated into a single action, Magistrate Judge Hanna in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted 
Estis’s motion to dismiss the claims for punitive damages under the Jones 
Act and unseaworthiness, reasoning that a prior Supreme Court decision 
limited both Jones Act and unseaworthiness recovery to pecuniary losses.83 
McBride appealed to the Fifth Circuit where a three-judge panel reversed 
the judgment of the district court, applying the reasoning of Townsend to 
hold that unseaworthiness punitive damages were available.84 After hearing 
the case en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed the panel and held that seamen 
could not recover punitive damages under unseaworthiness or the Jones 
Act.85 
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision 
The Fifth Circuit based its opinion on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,86 which the court found controlling.87 The 
court recognized that Miles held “the Jones Act limits a seaman’s recovery 
to pecuniary losses where liability is predicated on the Jones Act or 
unseaworthiness.”88 The court further explained that this pecuniary loss 
limitation should apply to both wrongful death and personal injury.89 The 
                                                                                                             
 78. McBride, 731 F.3d at 507.  
 79. Id. (noting that the injured crew members were Saul Touchet, Brian Suire, 
and Joshua Bourque). 
 80. McBride, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 512–13.  
 81. Id. at 512. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 512, 522. Although magistrates do not typically render judgments 
for the district court, the parties here consented to that procedure. Id. at 512. 
 84. McBride, 731 F.3d at 506–07, 518. 
 85. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2014).  
 86. 498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
 87. McBride, 768 F.3d at 384. Judge Davis wrote the opinion of the court and 
only Judge Southwick joined. Seven other judges concurred in the judgment: 
Jolly, Jones, Smith, Clement, Owen, Elrod, and Haynes. Id. at 382–83. 
 88. Id. at 384. 
 89. Id. at 388. 
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Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Townsend “reaffirmed that Miles is still 
good law.”90 The court explained that Townsend drew a distinction between 
maintenance and cure and the other remedies available to seamen so that the 
reasoning in Townsend should not extend to unseaworthiness, which was 
the cause of action directly addressed in Miles.91 Framing the Miles 
limitation to be “compensation” for pecuniary losses, the court reasoned that 
punitive damages were non-pecuniary because such damages do not 
compensate the seaman.92 The court concluded that, because punitive 
recovery is not available under the Jones Act, punitive damages are likewise 
unavailable in unseaworthiness claims.93 
Judge Clement, joined by four other judges, wrote a meticulous 
concurring opinion to explain the historical background that directed the 
court’s result.94 The concurrence first recognized that Supreme Court 
precedent does not require punitive damages in this case because Townsend 
concerned maintenance and cure, not unseaworthiness.95 Second, Judge 
Clement reasoned that no primary authority supports unseaworthiness 
punitive damages because courts should not use jurisprudence concerning 
maintenance and cure as a guide.96 Third, the concurrence undertook an 
analysis of the historical availability of unseaworthiness punitive damages 
and discovered that not many cases, if any, have actually awarded those 
damages.97 Judge Clement cited language in Pacific Steamship Co. v. 
Peterson98 to support the proposition that unseaworthiness plaintiffs have 
historically been entitled to only compensatory damages.99 Finally, the 
concurrence cautioned that admiralty courts should be hesitant to sign off 
“on an aggressive expansion of punitive damages in the unseaworthiness 
context” because of the sizable impact that this expansion would have on 
the shipping industry.100  
Two other judges filed a separate concurrence to argue that the Miles 
reasoning, prohibiting the recovery of non-pecuniary unseaworthiness 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. at 389. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 390.  
 93. Id. at 391.  
 94. Id. (Clement, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at 392. 
 96. Id. at 395 (“Rather, the primary authority supporting punitive damages in 
unseaworthiness cases appears to be a collective judicial ‘oh, hell, why not’ 
principle that holds that because punitive damages are available in many other 
types of actions they should also be available in unseaworthiness cases.”). 
 97. Id. at 397. 
 98. 278 U.S. 130 (1928). 
 99. McBride, 768 F.3d at 398.  
 100. Id. at 401 (“In light of the potentially sizable impact, this court should not 
venture too far and too fast in these largely uncharted waters without a clear signal 
from Congress.”). 
632 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
 
 
damages, is limited to only wrongful-death claims; accordingly, they 
argued that punitive damages should be made available to seamen only in 
cases of personal injury and not in wrongful-death or survival actions.101 
Because this concurrence emphasized that the expansion of a remedy is a 
subject best left to Congress, however, it joined in the result.102 
The primary dissenting opinion, which Judge Higginson authored and 
five others joined, essentially restated the decision Judge Higginson penned 
for the three-judge panel.103 This dissent interpreted Townsend as 
establishing that “the common-law tradition of punitive damages extends to 
maritime claims,” and “that in the face of historical dispute, the default rule 
of punitive damages applies.”104 Additionally, two judges wrote a second 
dissent to amplify the primary dissent’s “observation that extending the 
Miles pecuniary damages limitation to the injured crew members in this case 
compounds the error in the majority opinion.”105 Using similar reasoning to 
the second concurrence, this dissent argued that Miles should be applied 
only to wrongful-death causes of action.106 The judges also argued that the 
majority incorrectly assumed that compensatory and pecuniary damages are 
equivalent.107 The split in reasoning among the Fifth Circuit judges 
illustrates the confusion that currently exists regarding punitive damages for 
seamen, likely resulting from the unclear history of such damage awards in 
maritime cases.  
B. The Long, Stormy Voyage of Maritime Punitive Damages 
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit attempted to bring some clarity to the 
issue of maritime punitive damages for seamen; however, this task proved 
difficult, as the history and development of these damages has been 
tumultuous. In contrast to compensatory damages that are designed to 
compensate plaintiffs for actual losses, punitive damages serve to punish 
the defendant and deter the undesirable conduct in the future.108 The 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. (Haynes, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 404. 
 103. See id. (Higginson, J., dissenting).  
 104. Id. at 413 n.15. 
 105. Id. at 419 (Graves, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 424 (“For example, pain and suffering is not a financial loss and is 
difficult to reduce to a monetary amount; thus it is not a pecuniary damage 
according to the definition incorporated into FELA. Yet there can be no question 
that injured seamen can seek recovery for their own pain and suffering under the 
Jones Act and the general maritime law.” (citation omitted)). 
 108. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008). 
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history of punitive damages in maritime law is unclear.109 Their 
availability is often murky and actual recovery is rare, especially by 
seamen.110 By analogy, some Supreme Court decisions regarding loss of 
society damages are instructive as to whether a certain type of recovery 
can be judicially expanded when it is unavailable under a similar statutory 
claim.111 Although the Court has asserted the default availability of 
punitive damages under general maritime law, the question remains 
whether these damages are available to seamen for unseaworthiness.112  
1. The Availability of Punitive Damages to Seamen Before the Jones 
Act 
Although the fact that plaintiffs can generally seek punitive damages 
under the common law is fairly settled,113 whether that general rule extends 
to the wards of admiralty has been the subject of much debate.114 In Day 
v. Woodworth,115 the Supreme Court acknowledged that it is a “well-
established principle of the common law, that in actions of trespass and all 
actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, 
punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant.”116 Although the Court 
has recognized the general availability of punitive damages in the 
maritime tort context,117 few cases, if any, have awarded those damages to 
seamen.118 In The Amicable Nancy,119 the Court acknowledged the 
potential availability of punitive damages; however, the Court did not 
award those damages because the case was against the shipowner and not 
the pirates who plundered the ship.120 The Court’s likely motivation for 
                                                                                                             
 109. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 431 (2009) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“In sum, the search for maintenance and cure cases in which punitive 
damages were awarded yields strikingly slim results. The cases found are 
insufficient in number, clarity, and prominence to justify departure from the Miles 
uniformity principle.”). 
 110. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 111. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990). 
 112. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 476. 
 113. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 409. 
 114. See Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 86.  
 115. 54 U.S. 363 (1851). 
 116. Id. at 371. 
 117. See Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 108 (1893) 
(“[C]ourts of admiralty . . . proceed, in cases of tort, upon the same principles as 
courts of common law, in allowing exemplary damages . . . .”). 
 118. See infra Part II.B. 
 119. 16 U.S. 546 (1818). 
 120.  Id. at 558–59 (explaining that “if this were a suit against the original 
wrong-doers, it might be proper to . . . visit upon them in the shape of exemplary 
damages, the proper punishment which belongs to such lawless misconduct. . . . 
Under such circumstances, we are of opinion that they are bound to repair all the 
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mentioning punitive damages was simply to condemn piracy, which is less 
prevalent in the modern context of maritime personal injury.121 
Although the Supreme Court recently asserted in Townsend that 
punitive damages have historically been available to seamen, upon a closer 
look at the cases the Court cited for that proposition, whether such 
damages were actually recovered is unclear.122 In The City of Carlisle,123 
a 16-year-old seaman suffered a fractured skull while working on a ship, 
was forced to continue work for 6 or 7 weeks after the injury, and was 
denied medical care at the completion of the voyage.124 Based on the 
failure to provide maintenance and cure, the Carlisle court recognized that 
“the ship may be held to consequential damages,” resulting from the 
“gross neglect and cruel maltreatment” that aggravated the injury.125 The 
court awarded the boy $1,000, but whether these damages contained a 
punitive element is far from clear, especially because the court’s damage 
calculations appeared to be focused purely on compensating the degree 
that the injury was aggravated from neglect rather than punishing the 
defendant.126 In The Margharita,127 a case some claim lends the most 
support to the argument that punitive damages were available to seamen 
prior to the Jones Act, a shark bit off a seaman’s leg after he fell overboard 
and the captain still continued on with the voyage.128 The trial court 
awarded the seaman $1,500, explaining that the courts’ duty was not only 
to “compensate the seaman for his unnecessary and unmerited suffering 
                                                                                                             
real injuries and personal wrongs sustained by the libellants, but they are not 
bound to the extent of vindictive damages.” (emphasis added)). 
 121. See id. at 547. 
 122. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 430 (2009) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 123. 39 F. 807 (D. Or. 1889). 
 124. Id. at 810–12. 
 125. Id. at 817 (quoting The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 
1883)). 
 126. Id. (“Measured by this rule I estimate and assess these damages as 
follows: Hospital expenses for five months at $1 per day, $150; expense of 
trephining, $150; expense of journey to Liverpool, $200;—in all $500. This 
includes nothing for pain, suffering, or inconvenience resulting from the injury, 
whether temporary or permanent. He is entitled to wages until his return home or 
the end of the voyage, which will be about a year. This is £6, or $30. In addition 
to this, the libelant must have damages for the gross neglect and mistreatment he 
received after the injury, whereby his injury and suffering were much 
aggravated.”). Similarly in The Troop, a seaman was injured after falling from a 
mast, but the captain continued the voyage for thirty-six days; consequently, the 
seaman was required to undergo surgery upon his return home. 118 F. 769, 769–
70, 773 (D. Wash. 1902). In this case, the court gave the seaman an 
undifferentiated award of $4,000 with no mention of any punitive or exemplary 
element, only criticism of the captain’s behavior. Id. at 773. 
 127. 140 F. 820 (5th Cir. 1905). 
 128. Id. at 820. 
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when the duty of the ship is disregarded, but to emphasize the importance 
of humane and correct judgment under the circumstances on the part of the 
master.”129 The award did not contain any language regarding “punitive” or 
“exemplary” damages; rather, the award again appears to only compensate 
the seaman for his injuries, pain and suffering, and the worsened condition 
and aggravation of the injury.130 Even if this trial court award contained a 
punitive element, the Fifth Circuit ultimately reversed the award of 
damages.131  
Although none of these cases contain a clear award of punitive damages 
to a seaman, courts in this era often did not draw a fine distinction between 
punitive and compensatory damages.132 In many cases, determining whether 
the judge intended the monetary award to contain elements of punishment 
and deterrence may be impossible.133 Regardless of whether punitive 
damages have been historically available to seamen under general maritime 
law, some cases after the enactment of the Jones Act reasoned that the 
availability of punitive damages hinges instead on whether the damages are 
allowed under statutes that Congress enacted.134 
2. The Analogy to Loss of Society Damages After the Jones Act  
Fundamental conflict exists between the concurrent authority of 
Congress and the courts to determine the substantive law in admiralty.135 
Similar to the conflict concerning unseaworthiness punitive damages, the 
Court has addressed the problem of statutory preemption as it relates to 
loss of society damages in maritime law.136 In American Export Lines, Inc. 
v. Alvez,137 the Court held that a wife could recover loss of society damages 
resulting from nonfatal injuries that her husband suffered.138 Because the 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. at 828. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 824 (“Having in contemplation the whole case, and especially 
considering that the appellee received all the care and attention from the master 
and his fellow seamen it was possible to give on a freighting ship . . . we conclude 
that the master is not chargeable with fault or neglect in failing to deviate from 
his course to procure such aid.”). 
 132. See Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 84. 
 133. See, e.g., The City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807, 817 (D.C. Or. 1889). 
 134. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 135. See supra Part I.A. 
 136. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990). 
 137. 446 U.S. 274 (1980). 
 138. Id. at 276. “The term ‘society’ embraces a broad range of mutual benefits 
each family member receives from the others’ continued existence, including 
love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection.” Sea-
Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). Technically, Alvez was a 
harbor worker classified as a “Sieracki seaman” prior to the 1972 amendments. 
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Court had previously decided in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet that a 
spouse could recover loss of society through a wrongful-death action 
under general maritime law,139 the Alvez Court reasoned that “[w]ithin this 
single body of judge-formulated law, there is no apparent reason to 
differentiate between fatal and nonfatal injuries.”140 At the time Alvez was 
decided, the Court found irrelevant that the Jones Act precluded recovery 
for loss of society stating that “a remedial omission in the Jones Act is not 
evidence of considered congressional policymaking that should command 
our adherence in analogous contexts.”141 Although the Jones Act did not 
control the Court’s decision in Alvez, which concerned a maritime worker 
not covered by the Act, the Court has held that the Jones Act does control 
the remedies available to a true seaman.142 
In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the Court held that loss of society 
damages were unavailable in a wrongful-death action for unseaworthiness 
because the Jones Act prohibits non-pecuniary recovery.143 The Court 
reasoned that seamen no longer have to rely solely on the courts for 
protection because Congress has legislated extensively in the area of 
maritime tort remedies and as a result, the courts must look primarily to 
congressional legislation and stay within those limits.144 Miles was not the 
                                                                                                             
Alvez, 446 U.S. at 276 n.2 (“Alvez’ injury was sustained before the effective date of 
the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act.” (citation omitted)). 
 139. 414 U.S. at 575–76 (concerning the Death on the High Seas Act).  
 140. Alvez, 446 U.S. at 281. 
 141. Id. at 282–84 (“Nor do we read the Jones Act as sweeping aside general 
maritime law remedies. Notwithstanding our sometime treatment of longshoremen 
as pseudo-seamen for certain Jones Act purposes, the Jones Act does not 
exhaustively or exclusively regulate longshoremen’s remedies. Furthermore, the 
Jones Act lacks such preclusive effect even with respect to true seamen; thus, we 
have held that federal maritime law permits the dependents of seamen killed within 
territorial seas to recover for violation of a duty of seaworthiness that entails a 
stricter standard of care than the Jones Act.” (citations omitted)). 
 142. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32–33 (1990). 
 143. Id. (“It would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme 
were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of 
action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of 
death resulting from negligence. We must conclude that there is no recovery for 
loss of society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a Jones Act 
seaman.”). 
 144. Id. at 27 (“We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones 
must look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from 
injury and death; Congress and the States have legislated extensively in these 
areas. In this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative 
enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement these statutory remedies 
where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such policies consistent 
with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly within the limits 
imposed by Congress. Congress retains superior authority in these matters, and an 
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first case to use this statutory preemption reasoning. The Court reached 
the same conclusion in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,145 regarding the 
Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”).146 The Court held that loss of 
society damages should not be awarded under general maritime law in a non-
seaman wrongful-death action because, at the time of the Court’s decision, 
Congress limited recovery under DOHSA to pecuniary losses.147 The Miles 
reasoning has since been applied in varying maritime contexts, particularly in 
the availability of punitive damages.148 Whether the applicability of Miles is 
limited to wrongful death actions, however, is unclear.149 
                                                                                                             
admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries 
imposed by federal legislation.”). 
 145. 436 U.S. 618 (1978). 
 146. Id. at 625; Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (“Respondents argued that admiralty 
courts have traditionally undertaken to supplement maritime statutes. The Court’s 
answer in Higginbotham is fully consistent with those principles we have here 
derived from Moragne: Congress has spoken directly to the question of 
recoverable damages on the high seas, and ‘when it does speak directly to a 
question, the courts are not free to “supplement” Congress’ answer so thoroughly 
that the Act becomes meaningless.’ Moragne involved gap filling in an area left 
open by statute; supplementation was entirely appropriate. But in an ‘area covered 
by the statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of 
damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of 
beneficiaries.’” (citiations omitted)); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 
30302 (2012) (“When the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, 
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the 
shore of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may bring 
a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible. The action 
shall be for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s spouse, parent, child, or 
dependent relative.”). 
 147. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625 (“Congress did not limit DOHSA 
beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in order to encourage the 
creation of nonpecuniary supplements.”). The current version of DOHSA, 
however, allows for the recovery of nonpecuniary losses in commercial aviation 
accidents beyond twelve nautical miles. 46 U.S.C. § 30307(b) (2012) (“In an 
action under this chapter, if the death resulted from a commercial aviation 
accident occurring on the high seas beyond 12 nautical miles from the shore of 
the United States, additional compensation is recoverable for nonpecuniary 
damages, but punitive damages are not recoverable.”).  
 148. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf 
of Mexico, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 4575696, at *11 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2011) 
(applying the reasoning of Miles to conclude that seamen do not have a remedy 
of punitive damages for personal injuries, but punitive damages are available to 
non-seamen). 
 149. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044, at 
*10–11 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014) (“In sum, a general maritime claim of unseaworthiness 
can support a punitive damages award when brought directly by an injured seaman, 
but not when brought by a seaman’s personal representative as part of a wrongful 
death or survival action. Put simply, the remedy of punitive damages exists as it 
did prior to the passage of the Jones Act, and thus does not survive a seaman’s 
death.”). 
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3. The Default Rule: Punitive Damages are Available under General 
Maritime Law  
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,150 which concerned the infamous 
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Court held that the Clean Water Act’s prohibition 
on the recovery of punitive damages did “not bar a punitive award on top of 
damages for economic loss, but that the award . . . should be limited to an 
amount equal to compensatory damages.”151 In creating this 1:1 ratio 
between compensatory and punitive damages under general maritime 
common law, the Court reasoned that “no clear indication of congressional 
intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies” were evident.152 
Commentators have used Baker to argue that punitive damages should be 
made available to seamen, who, as the wards of admiralty, should be 
entitled to more protections than the non-seamen plaintiffs in this oil spill 
case.153 Considering the bar to recovery for negligence in The Osceola, 
however, courts have not always given seamen every possible remedy 
under general maritime law.154 Soon after the Court’s decision in Baker, 
the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of whether punitive 
damages are available to seamen for their employers’ failure to pay 
maintenance and cure.155  
4. The Court’s Maiden Voyage into Punitive Damages for Seamen 
In 2009, the Supreme Court held in Townsend156 that seamen could 
recover punitive damages “for the willful and wanton disregard of the 
maintenance and cure obligation . . . in the appropriate case[s] as a matter 
of general maritime law.”157 The Court based its decision on three main 
points.158 First, the Court recognized the general availability of punitive 
damages under the common law by indulging in a lengthy discussion of 
                                                                                                             
 150. 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 151. Id. at 476. 
 152. Id. at 489 (citation omitted).  
 153. David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, 
Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA. L. REV. 463, 477 (2010) [hereinafter Miles, Baker, 
and Townsend] (“The parties awarded punitive damages in Baker were ‘commercial 
fishermen, Native Alaskans, and landowners;’ the Court had no occasion to directly 
address seamen’s rights. However, it is hard to fathom how seamen, who by long 
tradition are admiralty’s most favored litigants, could somehow be worse off under 
federal maritime law than fishermen and landowners.” (quoting Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008))). 
 154. See 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
 155. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 424. 
 158. Id. at 414. 
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the English and American traditions regarding damages for outrageous 
conduct.159 Second, the Court reasoned that the common law tradition of 
punitive damages extends to maritime claims.160 The Court reviewed cases 
decided before the Jones Act, where the availability of punitive damages 
in the maritime context was generally acknowledged; however, none of 
these cases involved a clear punitive award to seamen.161 Third, the Court 
found no evidence that maintenance and cure actions were excluded from 
this general maritime law rule and that nothing in the Jones Act precluded 
such recovery.162 The Court determined that the Jones Act did not 
eliminate pre-existing remedies that were available to seamen prior to its 
enactment.163 Although the Court undermined the Miles uniformity 
principle by finding that this principle did not apply in the maintenance 
and cure context,164 the Townsend Court unequivocally reaffirmed Miles 
by stating that its reasoning “remains sound.”165  
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Alito, sharply criticized the 
majority’s failure to apply the Miles analytical framework.166 Justice Alito 
argued that Miles endorsed a principle of uniformity, “that if a form of 
relief is not available on a statutory claim, we should be reluctant to permit 
such relief on a similar claim brought under general maritime law.”167 He 
reasoned that because punitive damages are not available under the Jones 
Act, they should likewise be unavailable to seamen under general maritime 
common law for actions related to personal injury.168 The dissent also 
attacked the cases the majority used for its proposition that punitive 
damages have been historically available, arguing that whether punitive 
                                                                                                             
 159. Id. at 409–10. 
 160. Id. at 414. 
 161. Id. at 411–14; see discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 162. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 414–15. 
 163. Id. at 415. “Further supporting this interpretation of the Jones Act, this 
Court has consistently recognized that the Act ‘was remedial, for the benefit and 
protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty. Its purpose was 
to enlarge that protection, not to narrow it.’” Id. at 417 (quoting The Arizona v. 
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936)). 
 164. Id. at 424 (“The laudable quest for uniformity in admiralty does not 
require the narrowing of available damages to the lowest common denominator 
approved by Congress for distinct causes of action.”). 
 165. Id. at 420. 
 166. Id. at 425 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 167. Id. at 426. 
 168. Id. at 428 (“When Congress incorporated FELA unaltered into the Jones 
Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate FELA’s limitation on damages 
as well. . . . It is therefore reasonable to assume that only compensatory damages 
may be recovered under the Jones Act. And under Miles’ reasoning—at least in 
the absence of some exceptionally strong countervailing considerations—the rule 
should be the same when a seaman sues under general maritime law for personal 
injury resulting from the denial of maintenance and cure.” (citations omitted)). 
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damages were ever actually recovered in those cases is unclear.169 Alito 
contended that the “cases found are insufficient in number, clarity, and 
prominence to justify departure from the Miles uniformity principle.”170 The 
Court’s decision in Townsend sent waves through the maritime industry171 
but left unanswered whether punitive damages are available in another 
general maritime law cause of action for seamen—unseaworthiness.  
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit answered one of the many questions that 
Townsend left open in holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages are 
unavailable.172 The significance of the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in 
McBride cannot be understated. The issues the case raised are of national 
importance, including the questions of how far the reasoning of Townsend 
should extend, whether the Miles uniformity principle is still good law to 
be applied in the context of punitive damages, and the role of Congress 
and the courts in determining maritime law.  
III. UNSEAWORTHINESS PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD 
REMAIN UNAVAILABLE 
Unseaworthiness punitive damages should not be available to seamen 
under general maritime law for three reasons. First, the reasoning of 
Townsend does not extend to unseaworthiness.173 The historic availability 
of punitive damages for seamen is scarce, particularity for unseaworthiness. 
Further, maintenance and cure is a fundamentally different type of claim, 
such that the availability of those damages in that context is irrelevant.174 
Second, punitive damages are not available for a negligence action under 
the Jones Act, and that unavailability should extend to unseaworthiness 
because the two claims typically involve a single legal wrong.175 Third, no 
logical reason for drawing a distinction between personal injury and 
wrongful death recovery for unseaworthiness exists, and as such, punitive 
damages should be unavailable under both theories of recovery.176 
Therefore, the Supreme Court should reach the same result as the Fifth 
                                                                                                             
 169. Id. at 430 (“[A] search for cases in which punitive damages were awarded 
for the willful denial of maintenance and cure—in an era when seamen were often 
treated with shocking callousness—yields very little.”).  
 170. Id. at 431.  
 171. Rod Sullivan, Enforcing a Seaman’s Right to Medical Care After Atlantic 
Sounding v. Townsend, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 2 (2009) (discussing the practical 
problems that shipowners, seamen, and their maritime lawyers must face in the 
wake of the Townsend decision).  
 172. McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 173. See infra Part III.A. 
 174. See infra Part III.A. 
 175. See infra Part III.B. 
 176. See infra Part III.C. 
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Circuit in McBride and hold that unseaworthiness punitive damages are 
not available to seamen.177 
A. Townsend Does Not Control Unseaworthiness 
The holding of Townsend should not be extended to allow for 
unseaworthiness punitive damages.178 The primary dissent in McBride 
clarified the Townsend rule as follows: “if a general maritime law cause of 
action and remedy were established before the passage of the Jones Act, and 
the Jones Act did not address that cause of action or remedy, then that 
remedy remains available under that cause of action unless and until 
Congress intercedes.”179 The McBride dissent, however, misapplied this rule 
because, unlike maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness punitive damages 
do not appear to be historically established prior to the Jones Act.180 
Moreover, even if punitive damages were historically available for 
maintenance and cure, that availability does not extend to unseaworthiness, 
which is a separate and independent legal wrong that has significant overlap 
with the Jones Act.181 
1. No Punitive Damages Awarded to Seamen Prior to the Jones Act 
Although Townsend correctly stated that courts recognized the potential 
availability of punitive damages to seamen prior to the Jones Act, apparently 
no court during that era actually awarded punitive relief to a seaman.182 
Justice Alito acknowledged in his Townsend dissent that the search for cases 
                                                                                                             
 177. See infra Part III.D. 
 178. The technical holding of Townsend is that seamen can recover punitive 
damages “for the willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure 
obligation . . . in the appropriate case[s] as a matter of general maritime law.” 557 
U.S. 404, 424 (2009). 
 179. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 412 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(en banc) (Higginson, J., dissenting). The court also stated:  
The settled legal principles discussed above establish three points central 
to resolving this case. First, punitive damages have long been available 
at common law. Second, the common-law tradition of punitive damages 
extends to maritime claims. And third, there is no evidence that claims 
for maintenance and cure were excluded from this general admiralty rule. 
Instead, the pre-Jones Act evidence indicates that punitive damages 
remain available for such claims under the appropriate factual 
circumstances. As a result, respondent is entitled to pursue punitive 
damages unless Congress has enacted legislation departing from this 
common-law understanding.  
Id. at 412–13 n.14 (citing Townsend, 557 U.S. at 414–15).  
 180. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 181. See infra Part III.B. 
 182. See infra note 192. 
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that awarded punitive damages to seamen prior to the Jones Act produces 
scarce results.183 Upon a deeper analysis of the cases cited by the Townsend 
majority, the possibility that the damages contained any punitive element is 
unlikely.184 Although some scholars have alleged that these courts awarded 
punitive damages to seamen because employers failed to pay maintenance 
and cure, only a single unseaworthiness case during this time has been 
purported to contain an award of punitive damages.185 In The Rolph, a first 
mate with “a reputation for ferocity as wide as the seven seas” struck a 
seaman with a knot in a rope, causing serious injury.186 The court held that 
the employment of the brutal first mate rendered the ship an unseaworthy 
vessel, and the plaintiffs could therefore recover damages.187 Nevertheless, 
the damages awarded appear to merely compensate the seaman because the 
court only considered medical expenses and wages in its calculations.188  
Some scholars have argued that the reason these old cases do not appear 
to contain punitive awards is because courts have not made the distinction 
between punitive and compensatory damages until recently, leading these 
commentators to conclude that the punitive awards are hidden within a more 
general award.189 Even accepting that common law courts may have 
regarded punitive damages as “exemplary” or “vindictive,” however, no 
case before the Jones Act has been reported where this language was used 
in relation to a seaman’s award.190 One scholar has claimed that “[t]he 
weight of the jurisprudence is overwhelming: nineteenth-century seamen 
                                                                                                             
 183. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 431 (Alito, J., dissenting) (The search for 
“maintenance and cure cases in which punitive damages were awarded yields 
strikingly slim results.”). 
 184. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 185. See The Rolph, 293 F. 269 (N.D. Cal. 1923), aff’d, 299 F. 52 (9th Cir. 
1924). Note that this case does not even pre-date the Jones Act but was decided a 
mere three years after.  
 186. Id. at 269–70. 
 187. Id. at 272. 
 188. See id. (the court’s only language concerning damages is as follows: 
“Inasmuch as the injuries were fully set forth in the testimony by medical and 
other witnesses, the expectation of life and earnings of these men were laid before 
the court, there is no necessity for a reference to a commissioner in the usual 
manner. The decree, therefore, will provide that the judgment be, for Kohilas, in 
the sum of $10,000; for Kapstein, in the sum of $3,500; for Seppinnen and 
Arnesen, in the sum of $500.”). 
 189. Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 83 (“The term that best emphasizes 
this function is exemplary damages. This is the preferable term. It is not archaic. 
It emphasizes the right function. And its connotations are less harsh than those of 
‘punitive,’ connotations that further the rhetorical aims of those who would 
abolish the right to recover such damages. But the ‘punitive’ term has gained 
ascendancy.”).  
 190. See id. at 103–08. 
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indisputably had the right to seek punitive damages.”191 To the contrary, 
the jurisprudence is actually quite underwhelming because, in the cases 
cited by leading commentators and the courts as evidence that punitive 
damages have always been available to seamen, no reported case appears 
to have awarded punitive damages to a seaman prior to the Jones Act.192 
                                                                                                             
 191. Miles, Baker, and Townsend, supra note 151, at 482‒83. 
 192. See Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 103‒08. To state with 
particularity, the cases cited in this article for the proposition that punitive 
damages were awarded or available to seamen prior to the Jones Act are as 
follows: Pac. Packing & Navigation Co. v. Fielding, 136 F. 577, 580 (9th Cir. 
1905) (the Ninth Circuit held that the punitive award of the trial court was 
erroneous); The Margharita, 140 F. 820 (5th Cir. 1905) (discussed supra Part 
II.B.1); The City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807 (D. Or. 1889) (discussed supra Part II.B.1); 
The Troop, 118 F. 769 (D. Wash. 1902) (discussed supra Part II.B.1); The Rolph, 
293 F. at 272 (discussed supra note 186). See also Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 
supra note 151, at 479–83. The cases asserted in this article that punitive damages 
were available or awarded prior to the Jones Act are: The Svealand, 136 F. 109, 
113 (4th Cir. 1905) (“[T]he court thinks that an award of $500 should be made to 
the libelant for the additional suffering imposed upon him, and for the apparently 
aggravated character of the injury he sustained; the same to be paid in addition to 
all expenses incurred for medical treatment and cure of libelant, which in this case 
have been considerable, and on account of which the damages are fixed at so small 
an amount.”); Swift v. The Happy Return, 23 F. Cas 560, 561 n.2 (D. Pa. 1799) 
(judge merely discussed threatening a shipowner with a judicially-created 
monetary penalty in a completely different case); Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. 
Cas. 857, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (“The considerations before suggested will, in this 
case, augment the damages beyond a mere remuneration for the bodily injury 
sustained by the libellant, but will not entitle him to vindictive or aggravated 
damages.” (emphasis added)); The Scotland, 42 F. 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1890) 
(“[N]o punitive damages should be given, but only such as may fairly compensate 
the libelant for his actual loss through the delay in proper treatment.”); The 
Vigilant, 30 F. 288, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1887) (“Had I not been entirely satisfied of the 
master's good faith in his conduct, as well as of his intent to treat the seaman 
kindly and justly, I should have felt bound to add considerably to the sum above 
named.”); The Childe Harold, 5 F. Cas. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1846) (stating that 
“punitive and compensatory” damages would be appropriate if the ship had fed 
rotten food to the crew, but there was no such award in this case); Unica v. United 
States, 287 F. 177, 180 (S.D. Ala. 1923) (although the court called the conduct 
“inexcusable,” it posed a question which clearly indicated the purpose of the 
award was to compensate for pain and suffering: “What should be given him for 
this suffering? I know of no measure by which I can accurately determine it. Who 
would be willing to undergo it for any fixed compensation? A decree will be 
entered, fixing his damages at $1,500.”); Tomlinson v. Hewett, 24 F. Cas. 29, 32 
(D. Cal. 1872) (award was merely called “large” by the court); Latchimacker v. 
Jacksonville Towing & Wrecking Co., 181 F. 276, 278–79 (S.D. Fla. 1910), aff'd, 
184 F. 987 (5th Cir. 1910) (reversing a jury verdict that contained “exemplary” 
damages); Sheridan v. Furbur, 21 F. Cas. 1266, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1834) (stating “I 
should be disposed to visit such intemperate conduct with a punishment in 
damages corresponding to the wantonness of the wrong, . . .” but no such award 
was given); Brown v. Howard, 14 Johns. 119, 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) (stating 
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Although some trial courts awarded seamen punitive damages, those 
awards were reversed on appeal.193 The courts may have condemned the 
behavior of the shipowners in these cases, but the awards all appear 
compensatory in nature.194 Townsend argued that courts consistently 
recognized that punitive damages were available to seaman; however, the 
fact that those damages were never actually awarded undermines the 
strength and reach of the Court’s reasoning .195 Punitive damages should 
not be available to seamen because even though the remedy may have been 
“available” prior to the Jones Act, no court probably ever awarded this 
remedy.196 
A likely response to this assertion is that, although courts did not 
award punitive damages to seamen prior to the Jones Act, their availability 
was generally recognized.197 A sweeping judicial expansion of a remedy, 
however, should not be based solely on mere possibility.198 Rather, in the 
absence of clear historical awards of punitive damages to seamen, the 
courts should be reluctant to expand recovery under maritime claims and 
should instead defer such an important policy decision to Congress as a 
law-making body.199 
2. Maintenance and Cure is a Separate and Independent Claim from 
Unseaworthiness 
The reasoning of Townsend does not extend to unseaworthiness 
because maintenance and cure is, by its nature, a completely different type 
of action.200 Although both are general maritime law claims recognized by 
The Osceola as remedies available to seamen,201 they involve two separate 
legal wrongs. In contrast to unseaworthiness, the failure to pay 
maintenance and cure is a second injury occurring after the legal wrong 
that causes the initial injury to the seaman, specifically the unseaworthy 
                                                                                                             
“conduct of the captain merits severe animadversion” but no mention of an 
award). 
 193. See supra note 192. 
 194. See supra note 192.  
 195. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 412 (2009) (“In short, 
prior to enactment of the Jones Act in 1920, ‘maritime jurisprudence was replete 
with judicial statements approving punitive damages, especially on behalf of 
passengers and seamen.’” (quoting Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 115)). 
 196. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 412–13 n.14 (5th Cir. 
2014) (en banc) (Higginson, J., dissenting). 
 197. See supra note 192 (many of the cases do acknowledge the potential 
availability of punitive damages).  
 198. See McBride, 768 F.3d at 404 (Haynes, J., concurring). 
 199. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).  
 200. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 201. See 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
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condition of the vessel.202 Townsend recognized this distinction by 
emphasizing that “a seaman’s action for maintenance and cure is 
‘independent’ and ‘cumulative’ from other claims.”203 The failure to pay 
maintenance and cure is an intentional act by an employer who knows 
what an injured seaman should be owed, yet refuses to tender payment of 
medical care and living expenses.204 On the other hand, unseaworthiness 
requires no intent on the part of the employer, because the unreasonable 
condition of the vessel can exist without knowledge.205 Whereas the cause 
of action for the failure to pay maintenance and cure is a quasi-contractual 
obligation that arises after the injury, unseaworthiness and Jones Act 
negligence claims concern the work-related accident itself.206  
Although some have argued that the duty to provide a seaworthy 
vessel is also a quasi-contractual claim, the nature of unseaworthiness is 
more closely aligned to personal injury.207  Although the shipowner’s duty 
to provide a seaworthy vessel arises from the master-servant relationship 
and incident of the seaman’s employment contract, this duty is more 
similar to a reasonableness standard of care in tort law.208 The shipowner’s 
duty to provide a vessel reasonably fit for its intended use is comparable 
to a standard of care, the breach of which causes personal injury to the 
seaman.209 By contrast, the failure to pay maintenance and cure violates 
the contractual obligation to provide support to a seaman after injury—the 
legal wrong itself does not concern personal injury.210 Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s holding that punitive damages are available for maintenance and 
cure does not automatically extend to unseaworthiness simply because 
both are general maritime law claims.211 
                                                                                                             
 202. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 6:23, at 342. 
 203. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 (2009) (quoting Pac. 
S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1928)); see also Punitive Damages, 
supra note 47, at 147. 
 204. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 543 (1960). 
 205. See id. at 550. 
 206. See supra Part I.B.2–3. 
 207. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044, at *8 
(E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014) (“[U]nseaworthiness claims also have a contractual 
component, as they arise from the master’s duty to provide his servants with a 
seaworthy ship. As with the duty to provide an injured seaman with food and 
medical care, that duty is firmly anchored in the master/servant relationship . . . .”).  
 208. See id. 
 209. See Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. at 550. 
 210. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); but see Atl. Sounding Co. v. 
Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 422 (2009) (“[I]t also is true that the negligent denial of 
maintenance and cure may also be the subject of a Jones Act claim.”). 
 211. For similar reasons, maintenance and cure does not overlap with a 
negligence action under the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012). Some courts, 
however, have asserted such a connection by relying on Cortes v. Baltimore Insular 
Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932), which arguably reasoned that maintenance and 
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3. No Sound Reasoning for Unseaworthiness Punitive Damages After 
the Jones Act 
After the passage of the Jones Act, some courts held that seamen could 
recover punitive damages for unseaworthiness.212 The Fifth Circuit held in the 
case of In re Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc.213 that “punitive damages may 
be recovered under general maritime law upon a showing of willful and 
wanton misconduct by the shipowner in the creation or maintenance of 
unseaworthy conditions.”214 The court cited to various authorities to support 
this proposition, but only one of these cases actually awarded punitive 
damages.215 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits soon followed the Fifth Circuit’s 
lead.216 Merry Shipping was fundamentally flawed, however, because the 
court reasoned that the Jones Act and unseaworthiness were separable, that 
different classes of damages could be awarded for each, and that a 
                                                                                                             
cure arose under the Jones Act for equitable, not legal, reasons. Id. at 373–74. In 
Cortes, a seaman died because the shipowner failed to get him to a hospital in 
time, but the administrator of his estate could not recover any damages because a 
right of action for the denial of maintenance and cure ended with his death. Id. at 
370 (at this time no general maritime law action for wrongful death existed). The 
Court reasoned that maintenance and cure overlapped with the Jones Act—which 
had a wrongful death action—likely to avoid the inequitable result of a shipowner 
not having to pay damages because the seaman died. Id. at 375. Therefore, the 
Court would not want to create an incentive to kill seamen to avoid the payment 
of maintenance and cure. Id. at 375. But see De Centeno v. Gulf Fleet Crews, Inc., 
798 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that under the Jones Act, a shipowner 
negligently failed to provide adequate medical treatment to a seaman, often called 
“found”).  
 212. See In re Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 
1981).  
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 623. 
 215. In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1972) (punitive 
damages could be recovered upon a showing that the defendant was guilty of gross 
misconduct, but finding no such misconduct on the facts before it, the court upheld 
the denial of punitive damages); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th 
Cir. 1969) (punitive damages were available upon a showing of the shipowner’s 
reckless conduct, but the court reversed the trial court’s award of such damages 
finding that the evidence was insufficient to support it); Baptiste v. Superior Court 
for Cnty. of L.A., 106 Cal. App. 3d 87 (Ct. App. 1980) (punitive damages were 
available under general maritime law, and the court ordered the trial court to 
reinstate plaintiff’s claim for such damages). 
 216. See Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Punitive 
damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness 
. . . .”); Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1550 (11th Cir. 
1987) (“Punitive damages should be available in cases where the shipowner 
willfully violated the duty to maintain a safe and seaworthy ship . . . .”). 
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congressional statute could not bar recovery under general maritime law.217 
An intimate relationship exists between unseaworthiness and Jones Act 
negligence that does not similarly exist for maintenance and cure, and the 
Townsend Court even acknowledged this settled principle.218 Because both 
claims usually involve a single legal wrong, only one compensatory 
recovery should be available between unseaworthiness and the Jones 
Act.219 
Moreover, courts have recognized that Miles, which held that Jones 
Act recovery controlled unseaworthiness, overruled Merry Shipping and 
its progeny.220 The Court’s decision in Townsend should not bring Merry 
Shipping back from its watery grave because the Townsend Court 
reaffirmed the sound reasoning of Miles.221 Punitive damages should not 
be available in unseaworthiness because the Jones Act addressed a similar 
legal wrong in its negligence action, and the erroneous reasoning of Merry 
Shipping has been overruled or at the very least was called into serious 
question after the Supreme Court’s decision in Miles.222 
B. The Unavailability of Jones Act Punitive Damages Extends to 
Unseaworthiness 
Unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence are fundamentally two 
aspects of the same cause of action, where a seaman is entitled to just one 
indemnity by way of compensatory damages.223 Accordingly, under the 
Miles uniformity principle, unseaworthiness punitive damages are 
                                                                                                             
 217. Merry Shipping, 650 F.2d at 626 (“It does not follow, however, that if 
punitive damages are not allowed under the Jones Act, they should also not be 
allowed under general maritime law. First, unlike the Jones Act, no statutory 
restraints bar recovery under general maritime law. This body of law is wholly a 
product of judicial decisionmaking, fashioned on the basis of tradition and 
policy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 218. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009) (“It is 
unquestioned law that both the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness remedies are 
additional to maintenance and cure: the seaman may have maintenance and cure 
and also one of the other two.” (quoting GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 
6:23, at 342)); see also infra Part III.B. 
 219. See infra Part III.B. 
 220. See Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1507 (5th Cir. 
1995) (“After Miles, it is clear that Merry Shipping has been effectively overruled. 
Its holding—that punitive damages are available in a wrongful death action 
brought by the representative of a seaman under the unseaworthiness doctrine of 
the general maritime law—is no longer good law in light of the Miles uniformity 
principle because, in the factual scenario of Merry Shipping, the Jones Act 
damages limitations control.”), abrogated by Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
 221. See Townsend, 557 U.S. at 420 (“The reasoning of Miles remains sound.”). 
 222. See Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1507.  
 223. See Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928). 
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unavailable because such damages are not available under the Jones 
Act.224 
1. Punitive Damages Are Not Available Under the Jones Act 
The Jones Act imported into maritime law the same negligence action 
and remedies available to railroad workers against their employers for 
injury and wrongful death under the FELA.225 When the Jones Act was 
enacted, FELA was uniformly interpreted by the Supreme Court to limit 
the available remedies solely and exclusively to compensatory damages 
for pecuniary losses.226 In Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland,227 
the Court described the remedies available under FELA for wrongful death 
as follows: “[i]t is a liability for the loss and damage sustained by relatives 
dependent upon the decedent. It is therefore a liability for the pecuniary 
damage resulting to them and for that only.”228 The Court echoed this 
statement in Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. McGinnis,229 
unequivocally specifying that, “[i]n a series of cases lately decided by this 
court, the act in this aspect has been construed as intended only to 
compensate . . . for the actual pecuniary loss resulting to the particular 
person or persons for whose benefit an action is given.”230 Miles 
recognized that the FELA limitation on damages, which under Vreeland 
is limited to compensation for pecuniary losses, extends to the Jones Act 
because the Court “assume[s] that Congress is aware of existing law when 
it passes legislation.”231 Although this matter appeared to be settled, the 
Supreme Court opened the door to debate on the issue by dodging the 
question in Townsend.232 
                                                                                                             
 224. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990). 
 225. Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012). 
“Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, 
a railway employee apply to an action under this section.” Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 
30104 (2012).  
 226. See Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 68. 
 229. 228 U.S. 173 (1913). 
 230. Id. at 175. 
 231. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“When Congress 
passed the Jones Act, the Vreeland gloss on FELA, and the hoary tradition behind 
it, were well established. Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones Act, 
Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on damages 
as well.”). 
 232. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 n.12 (2009) 
(“Because we hold that Miles does not render the Jones Act’s damages provision 
determinative of respondent’s remedies, we do not address the dissent’s argument 
that the Jones Act, by incorporating the provisions of the Federal Employers’ 
2015] NOTE 649 
 
 
 
The current debate on whether punitive damages are available under 
the Jones Act hinges on the classification of punitive damages as either 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary.233 Some argue that punitive damages are 
pecuniary because they are susceptible of valuation in money and that 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker confirmed the pecuniary nature of punitive 
damages by developing its ratio for recovery in maritime law.234 Others 
claim the jurisprudence has consistently recognized punitive damages as 
non-pecuniary, and no support exists to deviate from that conclusion.235 
Regardless, the Court’s interpretation of the Vreeland gloss on the Jones 
Act is clear:  recovery is limited to compensation for pecuniary losses.236 
As such, punitive damages should not be available under either 
classification system because even if these damages are pecuniary, they 
do not provide compensation for losses.237 Considering that the word 
“pecuniary” has broad application, the Court’s language indicates that the 
more important word is “loss,” meaning that the goal is to compensate 
plaintiffs for their losses.238 Punitive damages do not compensate for a 
plaintiff’s loss; rather, these damages are designed to punish the defendant. 
For clarity, using the Court’s language in Pacific Steamship Co. v. 
                                                                                                             
Liability Act prohibits the recovery of punitive damages in actions under that 
statute.” (citation omitted)). 
 233. See Miles, Baker, and Townsend, supra note 151, at 473. 
 234. Id. (“[P]unitive damages can sensibly be called pecuniary. They are 
awarded as money, can be estimated-and-as recently exhaustively analyzed by the 
Supreme Court in Baker-are awarded as ‘measured retribution.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 235. Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1984); see 
also Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987); Miller v. Am. 
President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1454–59 (6th Cir. 1993); Horsley v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200, 202–03 (1st Cir. 1994); Guevara v. Maritime Overseas 
Corp, 59 F.3d 1496, 1506 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 
(2009); Neal v. Barisich, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 862, 873 (E.D. La. 1989); Anderson 
v. Texaco, Inc. 797 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. La. 1992). 
 236. See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173, 175‒76 
(1913). The Graves dissent in McBride makes an intriguing argument that if 
recovery is truly limited to compensation for pecuniary losses, then a seaman 
would not be entitled to damages for pain and suffering because such is a 
compensatory damage that is not easily susceptible of valuation in money: “The 
majority briefly implies that ‘pecuniary damages’ are broadly equivalent to 
‘compensatory’ damages.” McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 
422 (5th Cir. 2014) (Graves, J., dissenting). “[I]f we accept the majority’s 
unexplained implication that pecuniary damages must be equivalent to 
compensatory damages, it is not clear why loss of society would not have been 
recoverable in Miles or Higginbotham, as it is not at all clear why loss of society 
damages are any less compensatory in nature than damages for pain and 
suffering.” Id. at 424. This question, however, is outside the scope of 
unseaworthiness punitive damages.  
 237. See McGinnis, 228 U.S. at 175–76. 
 238. See id. 
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Peterson239 as a guide is preferable, which clarified that a seaman is only 
entitled to one indemnity of compensatory damages resulting from 
unseaworthiness or the negligence of his employer.240  
2. The Jones Act and Unseaworthiness are Intimately Limited to One 
Indemnity 
Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness have been called the 
“Siamese twins” of admiralty because they both involve a single legal 
wrong.241 Courts have acknowledged that unseaworthiness has been 
significantly expanded, and it currently resembles something close to a 
negligence action under the Jones Act.242 Commentators have long 
recognized that the claims are “inseparable and indivisible parts of a single 
cause of action.”243 The Court in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.244 
affirmed this view in stating that unseaworthiness and negligence under 
the Jones Act are “but alternative ‘grounds’ of recovery for a single cause 
of action.”245 The intimate connection between the two claims, unlike the 
tenuous link to maintenance and cure, demands consistent remedies.246 
The Supreme Court’s statement in Peterson best explains this principle:  
[W]hether or not the seamen’s injuries were occasioned by the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel or by the negligence of the master 
or members of the crew, or both combined, there is but a single 
wrongful invasion of his primary right of bodily safety and but a 
single legal wrong . . . for which he is entitled to but one indemnity 
by way of compensatory damages.247 
This reasoning establishes that Jones Act negligence and 
unseaworthiness are similar enough to constitute a single legal wrong or 
                                                                                                             
 239. 278 U.S. 130 (1928). 
 240. Id. at 138. The issue before the court, however, was not whether punitive 
damages could be recovered under the Jones Act or unseaworthiness; the question 
was actually whether a Jones Act seaman’s right to elect to bring a negligence 
action was barred by his receipt of maintenance and cure benefits. Id. at 139. 
 241. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 6:38, at 383. 
 242. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 418 (1953) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (“Since unseaworthiness affords . . . recovery without fault and has 
been broadly construed by the courts, it will be rare that the circumstances of an injury 
will constitute negligence but not unseaworthiness.”(citation omitted)). 
 243. See Kenneth G. Engerrand & Scott R. Brann, Troubled Waters for 
Seamen’s Wrongful Death Actions, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 327, 348 (1981) (footnote 
omitted). 
 244. 357 U.S. 221 (1958). 
 245. Id. at 225. 
 246. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 (2009).  
 247. Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928) (emphasis added).  
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single invasion of a primary right.248 Further, the reasoning clarifies that a 
seaman is entitled to a single recovery limited to compensatory damages, 
and is prohibited from recovering punitive damages.249 The Court’s use of 
the word “indemnity” is also significant because The Osceola uses that 
exact same word used to describe the recovery for unseaworthiness.250 The 
right to an indemnity includes only the ability to recover for losses and 
should not be extended to punitive damages, which do not concern a 
plaintiff’s loss.251 Notably, the “indemnity” limitation was not included in 
The Osceola’s pronouncement of the remedy available for failure to pay 
maintenance and cure.252  
The persuasive language in Peterson, however, was not a clear holding 
by the Supreme Court; rather, it could be interpreted as dicta because the 
issue in that case was actually whether a Jones Act seaman’s receipt of 
maintenance and cure benefits barred his right to elect to bring a 
negligence action.253 The Court’s citation of the Peterson decision in 
Townsend to describe the relationship between maintenance and cure, 
unseaworthiness, and the Jones Act, however, is telling.254 In doing so, the 
Court acknowledged that Peterson is an adequate authority on the 
interplay between the claims available to seamen.255 Moreover, the Court 
recognized even before The Osceola that a court goes beyond the limit of 
an indemnity by awarding punitive damages.256 Taken together, these 
                                                                                                             
 248. Id.; see also McAllister, 357 U.S. at 225. 
 249. See Peterson, 278 U.S. at 138. 
 250. See 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) (“That the vessel and her owner are, both 
by English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by 
seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply 
and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 251. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 837 (9th ed. 2009) (“A duty to make 
good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another. . . . The right of an injured 
party to claim reimbursement for its loss, damage, or liability from a person who 
has such a duty.”).  
 252. 189 U.S. at 175. 
 253. 278 U.S. at 139. 
 254. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 (2009) (emphasizing 
that “a seaman’s action for maintenance and cure is ‘independent’ and ‘cumulative’ 
from other claims such as negligence and that the maintenance and cure right is 
‘in no sense inconsistent with, or an alternative of, the right to recover 
compensatory damages [under the Jones Act]’” (quoting Peterson, 278 U.S. at 
138–39)). 
 255. See id. 
 256. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492 
(1875) (“It is undoubtedly true that the allowance of any thing more than an 
adequate pecuniary indemnity for a wrong suffered is a great departure from the 
principle on which damages in civil suits are awarded. But although, as a general 
rule, the plaintiff recovers merely such indemnity, yet the doctrine is too well 
settled now to be shaken, that exemplary damages may in certain cases be 
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cases stand for the proposition that even soon after the Jones Act’s passage, 
courts generally recognized that both unseaworthiness and Jones Act 
negligence concerned a single invasion of a primary right and that seamen 
should have only one compensatory recovery between the two claims.257 
Accordingly, seamen should be entitled to only one compensatory damage 
award between unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence.258 
3. Sailing in the Occupied the Waters of Congressional Action 
According to the sound reasoning of Miles, Congress has occupied the 
field of tort damages available to seamen.259 The Miles uniformity 
principle provides that if a certain type of relief is not available under a 
statutory claim, courts should be reluctant to permit that type of relief on 
a similar claim brought under general maritime law.260 To support the 
principle, the Court in Miles explained that courts should not overstep the 
legislative limitations that Congress has imposed.261 Because punitive 
damages are not available under the Jones Act, these damages should 
likewise be unavailable for the related claim of unseaworthiness under 
general maritime law.262 In some maritime contexts, the Court has found 
supplementation of a statutory gap entirely appropriate.263 Miles, however, 
responded to this argument, stating that “in an ‘area covered by the statute, 
it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of 
damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different 
class of beneficiaries.’”264 Here, the Jones Act addresses the damages 
recoverable in a personal injury action and therefore, supplementation in 
the general maritime law would be inappropriate.265  
By contrast, some argue that courts have construed Miles far too 
broadly.266 Critics argue that courts should read Miles narrowly because 
                                                                                                             
assessed.”); see also Christensen Eng’g Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 135 
F. 774, 782 (2d Cir. 1905) (“It is obvious that a fine exceeding the indemnity to 
which the complainant is entitled is purely punitive, and, notwithstanding the 
foregoing precedents to the contrary, we think that when it is imposed by way of 
indemnity to the aggrieved party it should not exceed his actual loss incurred . . . .”).  
 257. Balt. S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927). 
 258. Peterson, 278 U.S. at 138–39. 
 259. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990). 
 260. Id.; see also Townsend, 557 U.S. at 426 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 261. Miles, 498 U.S. at 27. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See generally Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) 
(creating a wrongful death action under general maritime law).  
 264. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginson, 436 U.S. 
618, 625 (1978)). 
 265. Id. at 27. 
 266. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 418–19 (2009). 
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the Court in Townsend limited the preemptive effect of the Jones Act on 
maintenance and cure.267 In addition, Townsend also stated that the 
purpose of the Jones Act was not to limit remedies, but to expand them.268 
Although Miles did not address maintenance and cure, the case directly 
addressed the overlap between unseaworthiness and the Jones Act; it 
concluded that because loss of society damages were not available under 
the Jones Act, such damages should not be available in unseaworthiness.269 
The Court unequivocally stated that “[i]t would be inconsistent with our 
place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive 
remedies in a judicially-created cause of action in which liability is without 
fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from 
negligence.”270 The legal overlap between Jones Act negligence and 
unseaworthiness is still good law, and the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the overlap since Miles.271 That the purpose of the Jones Act 
was to expand the remedies available to seamen, but Congress intended to 
expand recovery by creating a single cause of action—to simply give 
seamen a negligence action against their employers.272 Moreover, Miles 
was not such a sharp departure from previous admiralty precedent as some 
commentators claim.273 The reasoning of Miles was recognized earlier by 
the Court in Higginbotham regarding the statutory preemption of 
DOHSA.274 
The prohibition on double recovery between Jones Act negligence and 
unseaworthiness demonstrates that a statute can control recovery of a 
general maritime law claim.275 A seaman has a choice between recovering 
                                                                                                             
 267. Id. at 424–25 (“Limiting recovery for maintenance and cure to whatever 
is permitted by the Jones Act would give greater pre-emptive effect to the Act 
than is required by its text or any of this Court’s other decisions interpreting the 
statute.” (citations omitted)); see also deGravelles, supra note 67, at 139–40. 
 268. Id. at 417 (“Further supporting this interpretation of the Jones Act, this 
Court has consistently recognized that the Act ‘was remedial, for the benefit and 
protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty. Its purpose was 
to enlarge that protection, not to narrow it.’” (quoting The Arizona v. Anelich, 
298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936))). 
 269. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32–33 (1990).  
 270. Id.  
 271. See McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (2014). 
 272. See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991). 
 273. See Force, supra note 37, at 766 (“During the last twenty years, there has 
been a major change with respect to the recovery of damages for loss of 
consortium in American tort law.”); see also deGravelles, supra note 67, at 129 
(“The tide turned against seamen when the Supreme Court revisited the issue of 
loss of society damages in Miles.”). 
 274. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978). 
 275. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 n.10 (2009). 
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under the Jones Act or unseaworthiness.276 The prohibition against double 
recovery is significant because if courts made punitive damages available 
for unseaworthiness, seamen predictably would often choose to bring an 
action under unseaworthiness rather than the Jones Act. That result would 
circumvent a statutory remedy in favor of a judge-made remedy and 
violate the Miles uniformity principle.277 Therefore, because both the 
Jones Act and unseaworthiness involve the same legal wrong and 
Congress has occupied the field of seamen tort damages, unseaworthiness 
punitive damages should be unavailable since those damages are not 
available under the Jones Act. Nevertheless, courts are still undecided 
whether to limit the Miles reasoning only to wrongful death actions 
because that is all the Court directly addressed in Miles.278 
C. No Distinction Should Exist Between Personal Injury and Wrongful 
Death  
Courts have no reason to draw a distinction between the types of 
damages that can be recovered under a wrongful death action and a personal 
injury claim for unseaworthiness.279 Some courts have attempted to 
establish this distinction, however, arguing that punitive damages are 
available to seamen in personal injury cases but not to their representatives 
in wrongful death actions.280 In McBride, a significant division among the 
judges in the en banc Fifth Circuit concerned whether the prohibition on 
punitive damages should extend to personal injury.281 Regardless of 
whether the unseaworthy condition causes personal injury or death, that 
condition still involves the same legal wrong as a Jones Act negligence 
claim, where the seaman is entitled to only one indemnity by way of 
compensatory damages.282 
                                                                                                             
 276. See 2 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 26:40, 
at 113–16 (5th ed. 2003). 
 277. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990). 
 278. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 
3353044, at *10–11 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014). 
 279. See Am. Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 281 (1980) (reasoning 
that “[w]ithin this single body of judge-formulated law, there is no apparent 
reason to differentiate between fatal and nonfatal injuries”). 
 280. See Asbestos, 2014 WL 3353044, at *11 (“In sum, a general maritime 
claim of unseaworthiness can support a punitive damages award when brought 
directly by an injured seaman, but not when brought by a seaman’s personal 
representative as part of a wrongful death or survival action. Put simply, the 
remedy of punitive damages exists as it did prior to the passage of the Jones Act, 
and thus does not survive a seaman’s death.”). 
 281. See analysis of the en banc opinion supra Part II.A.2.  
 282. See Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928). 
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1. No Distinction Under the Jones Act 
Courts should not distinguish between personal injury and wrongful 
death because of the intimate connection between unseaworthiness and the 
Jones Act.283 Under FELA, which Congress incorporated by reference into 
the Jones Act, no distinction between wrongful death and personal injury 
exists. Likewise, courts should not draw a distinction under the Jones Act.284 
The Jones Act provides recovery for both personal injury and wrongful 
death, such that courts should extend the prohibition on recovering punitive 
damages under the Jones Act to unseaworthiness.285 The courts should not 
draw distinctions in recovery where Congress has not drawn such a 
distinction but instead should look to the legislature for policy guidance.286 
In contrast, some argue that the FELA prohibition on punitive damages 
applies only to wrongful death claims.287 No case under FELA, however, 
has allowed punitive damages for either personal injury or wrongful 
death.288 Although the case that originally announced the pecuniary 
limitation happened to involve wrongful death, the prohibition on punitive 
damages has also been acknowledged in the personal-injury context.289 In 
Wildman v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., the Ninth Circuit did not 
draw any distinction in its holding that punitive damages were unavailable 
for personal injury under FELA.290 Because the Jones Act incorporated 
                                                                                                             
 283. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 284. See Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir. 
1993) (“It has been the unanimous judgment of the courts since before the 
enactment of the Jones Act that punitive damages are not recoverable under the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act.” (citing Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 
449 F.2d 1238, 1240–43 (6th Cir. 1971))); Wildman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 
825 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[P]unitive damages are unavailable under 
the FELA.”). 
 285. See supra Part III.B. 
 286. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990). 
 287. See Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913) (“This 
cause of action is independent of any cause of action which the decedent had, and 
includes no damages which he might have recovered for his injury if he had 
survived.”).  
 288. See Miller, 989 F.2d at 1457 (“It has been the unanimous judgment of the 
courts since before the enactment of the Jones Act that punitive damages are not 
recoverable under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.” (citing Kozar, 449 F.2d 
at 1240–43); Wildman, 825 F.2d at 1395 (“[P]unitive damages are unavailable 
under the FELA.”).  
 289. See Wildman, 825 F.2d at 1395 (in a personal injury action, the court held 
that “punitive damages are unavailable under FELA”). 
 290. Id. 
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FELA, Jones Act punitive damages should be unavailable for both 
personal injury and wrongful death.291  
2. No Distinction Under the Miles Uniformity Principle 
Although the reason for establishing a distinction between the 
recovery for personal injury and wrongful death is based on the argument 
that courts should read Miles narrowly, the uniformity principle is actually 
a broad rule for how modern courts should fashion remedies in light of 
congressional action.292 Some argue that the pecuniary damages limitation 
applies only to wrongful death causes of action because that is all Miles 
addressed.293 The reasoning of Miles, however, plainly provides that if 
certain damages are not available under a statutory claim, those damages 
should be likewise unavailable for a similar claim under general maritime 
law.294 The purpose of this reasoning is to foster uniformity in admiralty.295 
Applying the Miles uniformity principle, courts should extend the 
prohibition of recovering punitive damages under the Jones Act for both 
personal injury and wrongful death to unseaworthiness because both 
involve a single legal wrong.296  
General maritime law did not, however, originally provide an action 
for wrongful death.297 Accordingly, it could be argued that Townsend 
limited the application of Miles because the Court stated that “it was only 
because of congressional action that a general federal cause of action for 
wrongful death on the high seas and in territorial waters even existed . . . .”298 
Because a personal-injury action for unseaworthiness existed before the Jones 
Act, punitive damages arguably could be available for personal-injury 
                                                                                                             
 291. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012) (“Laws of the United States 
regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply 
to an action under this section.”). 
 292. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044, 
at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014). 
 293. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (“Congress has 
placed limits on recovery in survival actions that we cannot exceed. Because this 
case involves the death of a seaman, we must look to the Jones Act.”); McBride 
v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 419 (2014) (Graves, J., dissenting) 
(“[R]ead with its proper scope, the pecuniary damages limitation recognized in 
Miles applies only to the wrongful death causes of action brought by McBride.”). 
 294. Id. at 27; see also Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 426–27 
(2009) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 295. See supra Part I.A. 
 296. See supra Part III.B. 
 297. See generally The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) (holding there could 
be no recovery for wrongful death in admiralty), overruled by Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).  
 298. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 420; see also McBride, 768 F.3d at 422 (Graves, 
J., dissenting). 
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unseaworthiness, but not wrongful death.299 This argument, however, 
undermines the fundamental reasoning of Miles that remains sound even after 
Townsend.300 The purpose of Miles, specifically its uniformity principle, was 
to promote uniformity under maritime law.301 Creating the anomaly that a 
personal injury seaman can recover punitive damages for unseaworthiness 
while the representative of a deceased seaman cannot is antithetical to the 
central purpose of Miles.302 Nevertheless, controversy regarding the scope 
of Miles still remains, and the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict 
that exists between the reasoning of Miles and Townsend.  
D. The Fifth Circuit Sets the Right Course for Unseaworthiness Punitive 
Damages 
The issues that McBride raised have substantial policy implications. 
The Fifth Circuit was the first United States Circuit Court of Appeals to 
hold that unseaworthiness punitive damages are unavailable in the wake of 
Townsend.303 Significant division among the federal district courts persists on 
this issue, however.304 Whereas McBride clearly prohibits unseaworthiness 
punitive damages in the Fifth Circuit, courts have allowed punitive recovery 
in other parts of the country.305 In light of the goal of uniformity, the remedies 
in American maritime law for unseaworthiness should be consistent.306 
Further, the availability of unseaworthiness punitive damages will have a 
major impact on the maritime shipping industry, where securing liability 
                                                                                                             
 299. See id. (“Unlike the situation presented in Miles, both the general 
maritime cause of action (maintenance and cure) and the remedy (punitive 
damages) were well established before the passage of the Jones Act.”).  
 300. See id. (“The reasoning of Miles remains sound.”). 
 301. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990).  
 302. See id. at 27. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court 
found that it was an anomaly that a longshoreman could recover damages for 
personal injury, but his representative could not if he died from the injury. 398 
U.S. 375, 378 (1970). In response, the Court created a wrongful-death claim under 
general maritime law based on Congressional intent and the national policy to 
provide such a remedy. Id. at 397.  
 303. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(en banc).  
 304. Compare Snyder v. L & M Botruc Rental, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 728, 737 
(E.D. La. 2013) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages are unavailable 
under general maritime law), with Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC, 2010 
A.M.C. 2469, 2483 (D. Haw. 2010) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive 
damages are available under general maritime law).  
 305. See In re Complaint of Osage Marine Serv., Inc., No. 4:10CV1674, 2012 
WL 709188, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. March 5, 2012). 
 306. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). 
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insurance coverage for punitive damages is often difficult.307 The availability 
of punitive damages will also drastically alter settlement negotiations, which 
is a critical part of litigating the maritime personal injury case.308 A uniform 
rule regarding unseaworthiness punitive damages is sorely needed. The 
Supreme Court should be motivated to provide a consistent interpretation of 
its previous decisions, which would allow the maritime industry to better 
predict their liability exposure.309 
Although the Fifth Circuit reached the correct result, this conclusion is 
not the end of the road for the debate over unseaworthiness recovery. Despite 
the Supreme Court’s recent refusal to answer this question,310 the Court will 
likely eventually have to settle this issue and decide a uniform interpretation 
of the interplay between Miles, Townsend, unseaworthiness, and the Jones 
Act. Considering the policy concerns and the national importance of this issue, 
the Supreme Court must heed the sound reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in McBride.311  
CONCLUSION 
In today’s maritime industry, the seas are much calmer. Although 
seamen were historically tossed into rough waters, the mere availability of 
punitive damages in these ancient times does not justify conjuring up the 
past to judicially expand claims. Even though current law entitles seamen to 
recover punitive damages for their employer’s failure to pay maintenance 
and cure, this reasoning does not extend to unseaworthiness and the Jones 
Act.312 Both unseaworthiness and the Jones Act involve the same legal 
wrong whereby a seaman is entitled to recover one indemnity—
compensatory damages.313 Additionally, courts have no reason to draw a 
recovery distinction between personal injury and wrongful death, as this 
distinction would create an unjust anomaly in maritime law.314 Therefore, 
                                                                                                             
 307. 46 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM § 1605, at 503 (Joseph J. Bassano & Kathy 
Macomber eds., 2007) (recognizing that the split of authority whether public 
policy prohibits the issuance of a liability insurance covering punitive damages). 
 308. Rod Sullivan, Enforcing a Seaman’s Right to Medical Care After Atlantic 
Sounding v. Townsend, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 32 (2009) (“A defendant in a civil 
suit that has liability insurance is therefore motivated, in a case where punitive 
damages are alleged, to pressure its insurance carrier to settle the liability portion 
of a lawsuit in order to avoid the prospect of having a judgment entered for 
uninsured punitive damages.”).  
 309. See supra Part II.B. 
 310. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015). 
 311. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 401 (5th Cir. 
2014) (en banc) (Clement, J., concurring). 
 312. See supra Part III.A. 
 313. See supra Part III.B. 
 314. See supra Part III.C. 
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the Supreme Court, using the persuasive reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in 
McBride, should conclude that unseaworthiness punitive damages are 
unavailable under general maritime law.  
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